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Abstract 
Sixteen years into the transition, the problem of high joblessness has not been solved. Of the 
three explanations commonly discussed (i.e. ongoing reallocation; finished reallocation with 
redundant labour; wrong choice of institutional framework), we concentrated on the ongoing 
reallocation hypothesis.  
We show that there is a negative correlation between job creation in the private sector 
and unemployment. We also show that long-term unemployment depends on current and past 
values of short-term unemployment and that this path-dependence fades away as soon as we 
reach time t-3. We interpret this result as an indication that the process of reallocation started 
at the beginning of the 1990s still influences today’s labour market. We address three 
components of the transition debate: shock therapy versus gradualism; privatization; and 
political change. Contrary to Godoy and Stiglitz (2006), we do not find gradualism superior 
to shock therapy in terms of private sector growth. In addition, we confirm that full 
privatization is positively associated with job destruction in the state sector. Finally, we show 
that during early years of democratization the state sector was dismantled more vigorously 
than in other periods. 
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1. Introduction 
Sixteen years into the transition, most countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEECs) and the former Soviet Union (FSU) are experiencing high unemployment 
rates (see Table 1). There are, however, differences across countries. While 
unemployment rates are double-digit in Poland, Croatia, Bulgaria and the Baltic 
states, Hungary reports rates in line with the EU15 average, which was 7.7 per cent in 
2005. What is a matter of concern is that in each country more than half of the 
unemployed are long-term (i.e. they have been unemployed for more than 12 months) 
– the EU15 average of the incidence of long-term unemployment was about 44 per 
cent in 2005 (OECD, 2006). Another matter of concern is that inactivity rates have 
substantially increased during the 1990s. One might suggest that the substantial 
increase in inactivity was due to a large proportion of older (55-64 year old) workers 
going into early retirement. A quick look at the data, however, shows that this is not 
the case (see Table 2, Panel A and B). Apart from the experiences of Poland, Hungary 
and Slovenia, the substantial increase in inactivity is largely explained by the increase 
in inactivity among prime-age (25-54 year old) individuals.  
There are three possible explanations for what we observe. First, the process 
of transformation from central planning to a free market could be still at work. In 
other words, countries are still reallocating resources from an inefficient initial 
allocation of labour and capital to more efficient uses. Along the path this process 
might also have been hindered by a series of macro-economic shocks (e.g., the 
tightening of monetary policy; delays in the implementation of reforms; the effects of 
the Russian financial crisis etc.) which might have added to the equilibrium 
unemployment rate. Secondly, job reallocation due to initial conditions is largely 
over, but it has left a legacy of unemployable workers-- some with the wrong skills 
and others located in the wrong regions1. This group of unemployable workers might 
be the main cause of the higher incidence of long-term unemployment we observe 
today. Thirdly, countries are experiencing high unemployment rates because they 
might have adopted the wrong institutions; thereby systematically increasing the long-
term equilibrium rate of unemployment. 
                                                 
1 As documented in Bornhorst and Commander (2006), regional migration flows within countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe are typically small. 
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The purpose of this paper is to try to assess the importance of the first 
hypothesis: the continuing process of transformation or transition. In order to identify 
whether the process of job reallocation is still at work and, more importantly, whether 
the high rate of unemployment today is a direct consequence of how the reallocation 
process has occurred over time, we look at the relationship between job creation, job 
destruction and unemployment taking into account pre-transition (initial) conditions 
and policies that vary across countries. In doing so, we also address three issues that 
since the beginning of the 1990s dominated the debate on how best to secure the 
transition from socialism to capitalism: shock therapy versus gradual change; 
privatization of state enterprises; the link between political change and economic 
change. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, two school of thoughts developed, one 
advocating shock therapy and the other supporting gradual change. The former 
contended that the faster these countries achieved an economic structure similar to 
market economies, the better their economic performance would be, and that the best 
way to do so was to liberalise and privatise as quickly as possible. The latter school 
worried that without the institutional infrastructure, which could only be created 
gradually, privatization and liberalization might lead to asset stripping rather than 
wealth creation. 
Recently, Godoy and Stiglitz (2006) have re-opened the debate addressing the 
relevance of both the ‘level’ and the ‘speed’ of reform in a paper that uses a cross-
country estimation of economic performance among 23 transition countries. They find 
that while shock therapy was not conducive to success (measured in terms of higher 
GDP growth), a gradual change was. In this paper, we also analyse the role of both the 
level and the speed of reform in explaining job creation in the private sector and job 
destruction in the old sector using a panel of 12 transition countries over the years 
1989-2003. We find that neither shock therapy nor gradualism were conducive to 
higher job creation in the private sector and higher job destruction in the old sector. 
Privatization was another crucial component of the debate on how best to 
secure the transition. Privatization was intended to address the fundamental problems 
of enterprise inefficiency, lack of market orientation and lack of innovation that 
characterised enterprises under central planning. In early transition, countries suffered 
from a lack of domestic savings and an underdeveloped institutional framework, 
particularly with respect to capital markets. It was then realised that conventional 
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methods of privatization by tender and through public offerings would not always be 
appropriate (Blanchard et al., 1991). New privatization methods were developed, 
including manager-employee buyouts (MEBOs) and mass privatization.  
An extensive literature looks at the impact of privatization on firm 
performance (as summarised in Djankov and Murrell, 2002) and on how different 
methods of privatization have affected the structure of private ownership post-
privatization (see, e.g., Meggison and Netter, 2001). To our knowledge, only one 
study looks at the impact of different privatization methods on economic performance 
(see Bennett et al., 2004). In this paper, we apply the classification of privatization 
methods introduced by Bennett et al. (2004) and investigate the impact of different 
privatization methods on job destruction in state firms.  
Different privatization methods may lead to different ownership structures that 
have a higher or lower propensity towards firm restructuring and firm downsizing. For 
instance, while MEBOs are more likely to create an environment that opposes 
restructuring, full privatization – the sale of firms to outsider investors for a positive 
nominal price – is more likely to bring about restructuring (see Aghion and 
Blanchard, 1994; Blanchard, 1997). Our results confirm the expectation that full 
privatization is associated with higher job destruction in the old sector.  
The third component of the debate was the link between political change and 
economic change. Since the beginning of the 1990s, much debate has taken place 
regarding the role of democratic institutions in achieving economic prosperity in 
former socialist economies (see, e.g., Shleifer, 1997; Shleifer and Vishny, 1996). 
Kornai (2006) goes so far to assert that: 
 “There is no democracy without capitalism, but there is capitalism without 
democracy” (Kornai, 2006, page. 217, emphasis added) 
Kornai (2006) describes the example of China: well on the road to economic 
reform without embracing the western democratic process. He contrasts this with the 
CEECs: struggling with the economic reform, but having embraced democracy and 
working on establishing democratic institutions. He warns us not to judge the process 
of transformation looking only at economic results, but also taking into account the 
progress in democratization. 
In this paper, we use a simple measure of political change defined as the first 
election year that has brought a new coalition or a new government into power that 
represented the first clear cut from the past.  We look at the impact of this political 
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measure on the rate of job destruction in the old sector. It seems that when countries 
adopted a democratic system of government, they were more willing to engage in 
reform, allowing substantial downsizing of state-owned enterprises. Thus, we see a 
positive relationship between political change and firm downsizing in the old sector. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a simple theoretical 
framework that describes the transition process in terms of job destruction in the state 
sector and job creation in the private sector. We describe the data in section 3. We 
conduct our empirical analysis in section 4. First, we analyse the determinants of job 
creation in the new private sector. Secondly, we analyse the determinants of job 
destruction in the old sector. Thirdly, we look at how the rate of unemployment today 
depends on the history of past unemployment. We conclude in section 5. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
Following the literature (see, e.g., Flemming, 1993, Aghion and Blanchard, 1994, 
Blanchard and Keeling, 1996, Blanchard, 1997), we also discuss transition by using a 
two-sector model. The model is usually presented in the form of a ‘state sector’ 
producing a mediocre good and receiving state subsidies before transition, and a ‘new 
sector’ producing a better quality good and bearing the burden of taxation. Transition 
is typically modelled as a removal of subsidies to state firms or an elimination of taxes 
to private firms. In early transition, the removal of subsidies results in a decrease in 
state employment and (as long as real wage does not change) in an increase in 
unemployment. Private employment is unaffected. As transition proceeds and the 
initial phase of disorganisation is over, private alternatives increase (Blanchard and 
Kremer, 1997). Private sectors firms become net job creators. 
Unemployment might also increase as state firms restructure. On a micro 
level, restructuring implies that state firms must change in the structure and 
organisation of their production. They must close inefficient plants and open new 
ones, they must close low quality product lines and open high quality ones; and they 
must replace obsolete equipment and capital. On a macro level, restructuring has two 
implications. On one hand, it increases production and output because restructured 
firms are more efficient and, on the other hand, it leads to an increase in 
unemployment because firms that engage in restructuring experience a drop in 
production, at least for some time.  
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As long as job destruction in the old sector is at work, unemployment will be 
higher than in the steady state. Even when job destruction in the old sector is 
achieved, it will take some time for the private sector to reduce unemployment.  
What can we learn from looking at the co-movements of job creation, job 
destruction and unemployment, taking into account that initial conditions and policies 
vary across countries and the fact that we can only hope to observe them imperfectly? 
In order to answer this question, we need to express the model in mathematical terms 
and derive testable specifications2. 
Job destruction in the state sector depends on initial conditions (I), policies 
affecting destruction (PD) and negatively on the remaining size of the state sector (S): 
 
JDS = JDS(I, PD, S) where JDS(., ., 0)=0 (1) 
 
Job creation in the new sector is determined by initial conditions, policies 
affecting creation (PC) and labour market conditions measured by unemployment (U): 
 
JCN = JCN(U, I, PC)  (2) 
 
Since JCS and JDN are assumed equal to zero, JDS and JCN also measure net 
destruction in the state sector and net creation in the private sector. Thus, any change 
in unemployment is expressed as: 
 
∆U ≡ JDS – JCN  (3) 
 
The steady state of this model is given by JDS = 0 and net job creation in the 
new sector equal to zero: 
 
JCN (U*, I, PC) = 0  (4) 
 
The solution to equation (4) gives us the equilibrium unemployment rate (U*). 
In this case, we do not have path-dependence. Path-dependence implies that current 
                                                 
2 I am indebted to Olivier Blanchard for suggesting a framework for this idea to me. 
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unemployment depends on past unemployment and thus on the history of job 
destruction and creation. 
To the researcher initial conditions and the relevant policies might be only 
partly observable. If we call Î and Ĉ the observable components of each of the two 
variables I and PC, we can express eq.(4) as follows: 
 
εγβα +++= CIUJCN ˆˆ)ln(  (5) 
 
where ε, which includes the omitted institutions and policies, is likely to be 
correlated with the observable initial conditions and job creating policies (omitted 
variable bias). In addition, ε is likely to affect U through its effects on past values of  
JCN (endogeneity bias). Omitted variable bias is unlikely to be eliminated. 
Endogeneity may be eliminated through the use of instrumental variables. We could 
not, however, find a valid instrument for U. This potential endogeneity makes our 
interpretation of the impact of U on JCN problematic: the casual-effect correlation 
could go either way. Since we cannot solve the problem, we supplement our 
estimations of eq.(5) with others which use unemployment (instead of JCN) as the 
outcome variable. 
Our empirical strategy is as follows. We are interested in knowing the 
correlation between U and JCN in equation (4). The correlation can either be positive 
or negative. A positive correlation suggests that higher unemployment is associated 
with lower wages, higher profits and, thus, higher job creation. A negative correlation 
indicates that higher unemployment is associated with higher unemployment benefits, 
higher taxes and lower job creation. A negative correlation also suggests that higher 
unemployment is associated with lower wages, disposable income and consumption 
and, thus, with lower production and job creation in the private sector. In this latter 
case, high unemployment is expression of a depressed demand and a depressed 
economy. This model still does not exhibit path-dependence.  
An extension of the model which does distinguish between active or short-
term unemployment (UA) and inactive or long-term unemployment (UNA) can exhibit 
path-dependence. The unemployed in the first pool are employable; those in the 
second are not: 
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JDS = JDS(I, PD, S) where  JDS(., ., 0)=0 (6) 
JCN = JCN(UA, I, PC)  (7) 
∆UA  = JDS – JCN - δUA  (8) 
∆UNA = δUA  (9) 
 
Eq.(8) and (9) suggest that each year there is a fraction of the active unemployed 
(measured by δ) that cannot find a job and moves into long-term unemployment. The 
long-term unemployed have greater difficulties exiting the unemployment pool. 
 In this new scenario, steady-state active unemployment is still determined 
independently of the path of unemployment: 
 
JCN (UA*, I, PC) = 0  (10) 
 
Total unemployment is equal to the sum of active and inactive unemployment 
(UA+UNA) and the second term depends on the history of active unemployment and 
thus on the rate of job destruction and creation. By using equation (9), we can express 
long-term unemployment as a function of contemporaneous and past short-term 
unemployment rates: 
 
UNA t = δ0 UA, t + δ1 UA, t-1 + δ2 UA, t-2 + δ3 UA, t-3 +…+ δs UA, t-s (11) 
or 
itA
I
i
itNA UU −
=
∑= ,
0
, δ   (12) 
 
where (t-I) refers to the beginning or start of transition when we assume that 
unemployment was negligible. By using equation (8), we can express short-term 
unemployment as a function of the history of job destruction and job creations rates: 
 
∑
=
+−+− −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+=
J
j
jtjt
j
tA JCNJDSU
1
11, )(1
1
δ  (13) 
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By substituting equation (13) in equation (12) and recognising that i=j-1, we 
obtain that long-term unemployment or inactive unemployment depends also on the 
history of job destruction and creation: 
 
∑
=
−− −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+=
I
i
ititi
i
tNA JCNJDSU
0
, )(1
1*
1
1 δδδ  (14) 
 
In our empirical analysis we proceed as follows: firstly, we estimate the 
steady-state relationship between unemployment and private sector growth; secondly, 
we analyse the determinants of job destruction in the old sector; thirdly, we analyse 
the steady-state relationship between active unemployment and job creation in the 
private sector; and finally, we estimate long-term unemployment level and growth 
rate as a function of contemporaneous and past short-term unemployment rates. In the 
latter set of regressions, we apply both a fixed effect estimation and a fixed effect 
estimation with AR(1) residuals.  
 
3. Description of the data 
We construct job creation and destruction rates by country, year and firm ownership 
using company accounts data collected in the Amadeus Database. The data at our 
disposal consist of annual samples of large and medium enterprises in ten CEECs (i.e. 
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, and Slovenia) and two countries of the Former Soviet Union (i.e. Russia 
and Ukraine).  
Since Amadeus data only cover the period 1995-2003 and do not provide 
employment information for Hungarian firms, we use data on job flows published in 
other studies to create the series or to complete the series in early years3. Job flow 
rates for Hungary are taken entirely from Korosi (2003). Old sector destruction rates 
for Ukraine and Russia are taken from Brown and Earle (2002, 2004). Job flow rates 
for the Czech Republic which cover the period 1991-1996 are taken from Jurajda and 
Terrell (2002). Data on Estonia for the period 1989-1994 are taken from Haltiwanger 
and Vodopivec (2002), and Jurajda and Terrell (2002). Early data on traditional Polish 
                                                 
3 For more information on data sources, see Tables A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A. 
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firms are taken from Konings, Lehman and Schaffer (1996). Old sector destruction 
rates in Slovenia are taken from Bojnec and Konings (1998). 
We are aware of the difficulties in combining data from different data bases. 
This comparison may suffer from inconsistency because of different data coverage, 
different representations of the economy, and different types of data. Notwithstanding 
these limitations, we believe the exercise is worth pursuing with the caveat that the 
results of our analysis could only be suggestive. For a limited number of countries, we 
compared job creation and destruction rates computed using the Amadeus data base 
with country studies based on other firm level data (i.e., Markov and Dobrinsky, 
2005, for Bulgaria; Korosi and Turlea, 2005, for Estonia; Masso et al., 2005, for 
Estonia). Looking at the samples of foreign-owned and state owned firms, we find 
that the rate differentials between Amadeus and other data sets are negligible. 
The Amadeus database consists of company accounts data of incorporated 
firms that satisfy at least one of the following criteria: number of employees greater 
than or equal to 15, total assets greater than or equal to €2 million and operating 
revenues greater than or equal to €1 million. For the Ukrainian sample, the selection 
criteria are stricter: number of employees greater than or equal to 20, total assets 
greater or equal to €3 million and operating revenues greater or equal to €1.5 million. 
Data are collected by independent research units, under the supervision of the national 
official agency in charge of collecting company accounts data for each respective 
country (i.e. Companies House in the UK, Kamers van Koophandel in the 
Netherlands, and INPI in France). Data are then compiled by the research units in a 
consistent format following guidelines given by Bureau van Dijk, the publisher of the 
Amadeus data base. Thus, the main advantage of the data is that they are comparable 
within a country and across countries. 
The Amadeus data set has, nevertheless, some drawbacks: (1) it neither 
provides information on the skill-composition of a firm workforce nor does it provide 
information on the extent to which a firm employs temporary workers; (2) given the 
selection criteria, it is not representative of small enterprises; (3) Amadeus data are 
better described as a collection of cross-sectional samples rather than a panel of firms 
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that can be followed over time; (4) ownership information was collected only recently 
but, unfortunately, there is no information on the history of the firm’s ownership4.  
We distinguish three ownership types: foreign, state and domestic private 
firms. We use state and domestic private firms to describe the behavior of firms in the 
old sector. We use foreign firms to infer the behavior of enterprises in the new private 
sector5. We refer to foreign firms as majority foreign-owned enterprises, i.e. firms 
characterized by a foreign equity share greater than 50 percent.  We refer to state 
firms as majority state-owned enterprises, i.e. firms characterized by state 
participation greater than 50 percent. We refer to domestic private firms as those firms 
which are characterized by either state or foreign minority participation, and firms that 
are totally domestically-owned. This category includes domestically-owned privatized 
firms6.  
We also experiment with a different method to split foreign and state firms. 
We refer to foreign firms as all firms with a foreign participation apart from when the 
State owns more than 50% of the firm equity. We refer to state firms as all firms with 
a state participation if there are not already defined as foreign-owned. We refer to 
domestic firms as those with neither foreign nor state participation. We obtain very 
similar job creation and job destruction rates using either ownership classification. In 
the paper we concentrate on the former7.  
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Job creation in the new sector  
Job creation rates for the private sector as a whole are available for Estonia (1989-
1995) and the Czech Republic (1990-1996). Job creation rates across foreign-owned 
firms, retrieved from Amadeus and taken from Korosi (2003), are used instead of job 
creation rates across private firms for all other countries. Slovenia cannot be included 
in the analysis because ownership information was not available. Notwithstanding 
                                                 
4 For Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, we combined three different waves of the Amadeus database (the 
first retrieved in January 1999, the second in October 2003 and the third in January 2005) for which we 
have ownership information on firms. For a sub-sample of these firms, it is then possible to construct 
the history of the firm’s ownership. 
5 The share of foreign-owned firms in total firms computed using the Amadeus database is shown in 
Table A.3 in Appendix A. 
6 Co-operatives are also included in this residual category but the number of co-operatives in our data is 
small. 
7 See Appendix B and Appendix C for a description of job destruction and job creation rates in the new 
sector and old sector, respectively. 
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these limitations, we conduct the analysis regressing job creation rate in the private 
sector on log unemployment rate, initial conditions (Î) and policies affecting job 
creation (Ĉ): 
 
∑ ∑ +Χ+Χ++++=
i t
ittiititit CIUJCN εββββββ 543210 ˆˆ)ln(  (15) 
 
U is unemployment rate, end-year. Unemployment is taken from the EBRD 
Annual Transition Report (1995-2004), ILO, Key Labour Market Indicators (2005) 
and OECD, Employment Outlook (2006).  
We experiment with different measures of initial conditions (Î), such as the 
country share of industry in employment and the current account in GDP. While the 
share of industry in employment may capture the initial distortion in the allocation of 
resources towards industry and manufacturing, the trade variable may capture the fall 
and re-direction of trade after the collapse of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (COMECON). We expect that countries with a large share of industry in 
employment or a large current account in GDP will be slower in shedding labour from 
the old sector perhaps because of a stronger opposition to restructuring expressed by 
insiders and the Government concern to avoid mass lay-offs. This might hinder job 
creation in the private sector.  
Policies affecting creation (Ĉ) might be measured by: (1) the money market 
rate or the lending rate which regulates the firm’s access to credit; (2) the corporate 
tax rate which measures how the burden of taxation may hinder private sector growth; 
(3) the foreign direct investment (FDI) share in GDP or the trade share in GDP, which 
capture the effect of foreign capital and country’s openness on private sector growth; 
(4) the EBRD indices of small scale and large scale privatization, which have been 
used to measure the progress in liberalization reforms (see Godoy and Stiglitz, 2006). 
We will consider both the level and the rate of change of these indices. As Heybey 
and Murrell (1999) and Godoy and Stiglitz (2006) so forcefully explained, it is 
important to discriminate the effect of policy level from policy change on growth.  
We also include country and year dummy variables in equation (15). We can 
either measure time as calendar time (i.e. chronological time) or as time since the 
beginning of transition in each country (i.e. transition time). While calendar time 
dummies capture current macro-economic shocks, transition time dummies better 
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control for the pace of reform implementation in each country during the transition 
process. Thus, we choose the latter measure. For each country, there is one year in the 
early 1990s in which there was a sharp decrease in industrial production. We set time 
equal to zero in that year. Since Blanchard (1997), this measure has been used as a 
good indicator for the change in economic regime.  
 
4.1.1 Relationship between job creation in the new sector and unemployment 
We start investigating the correlation between job creation in the private sector and 
unemployment. As suggested in section 2, the effect can either be positive or 
negative. A positive effect indicates that higher unemployment is related to lower 
wages and higher profitability. A negative effect indicates that higher unemployment 
is related to higher unemployment benefits and the possibility of higher taxation or, 
alternatively, that higher unemployment is related to lower income and lower demand. 
Thus, it might be sign of a depressed economy. 
We find a negative correlation between job creation in the new sector and 
unemployment (see Tables 3, column 1)8. By including country and time dummies in 
the estimation, we apply a fixed effects or within-estimator model. Precisely, this 
method is referred to as the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimation and 
gives identical results as the standard fixed effects model. Taking into account these 
effects, the correlation between unemployment and job creation in the new sector is 
about -14 per cent: an increase of 1 per cent in unemployment is associated with a 
decrease of 14 per cent in private sector growth.  
In order to interpret this negative correlation, we evaluate the two explanations 
previously suggested: (1) the high unemployment benefits-high taxation channel and 
(2) the lower demand-lower production channel. In early transition, most CEECs 
introduced relatively generous unemployment benefit systems compare to Western 
standards; a few years into the transition, however, they restricted their generous 
allowances. As documented by Blanchard, Commander and Heitmueller (2006), net 
replacement rates and the share of individuals eligible for unemployment benefits 
declined over the 1990s. In addition, corporate tax rates declined in all countries over 
the last decade in an effort to stimulate private sector growth. These facts indicate that 
the high unemployment benefits-high taxation channel cannot provide a convincing 
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explanation for the negative correlation between unemployment and new firms’ 
activity that we find. 
Taking final household consumption per capita as a measure of aggregate 
demand, we find a negative and significant correlation between unemployment and 
aggregate demand: a 1 per cent increase of unemployment is associated with a 9 
percent decrease in final consumption per capita. This finding gives some support to 
the lower demand-lower production channel hypothesis. 
We then conduct a series of robust checks. We first split the sample of 
countries into two groups: group A and group B. Group A consists of early-reforming 
countries, such as Estonia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, and 
Lithuania. These countries have been characterised by a surge of economic activity in 
the private sector at the beginning of transition, followed by a more moderate activity 
rate in the subsequent years. The fact that unemployment seems to have followed just 
the opposite direction, lower in early transition and higher later on, explains why we 
find a negative correlation. 
Group B consists of a few late-reforming countries such as Bulgaria, Romania, 
Russia, Ukraine and Croatia. Late-reforming countries have suffered low private 
sector activity in early transition and experienced higher rates as reforms were 
effectively implemented. For slow-reforming countries, we find a positive, but 
insignificant correlation between unemployment and private activity (see Table 3, 
column 2).  
We then perform the same type of regressions replacing the unemployment 
rate, which is defined as the number of unemployed in the labour force, with another 
measure of labour market conditions: the number of unemployed among all those 
non-employed (i.e. the sum of the unemployed and the inactive). Compared to the 
unemployment rate, this latter measure takes into account those who do not have a job 
and are not part of the labour force: the inactive. Considering this group could be 
important in identifying the appropriate measure of joblessness. Hungary provides the 
example of a country with low unemployment, but high inactivity rate. Looking at the 
results, we still find a negative correlation between job creation in the private sector 
and the share of unemployed in non-employed. Moreover, we do not detect any 
difference between early-reforming and late-reforming countries. 
                                                                                                                                            
8 We conduct estimations for both job creation and net job creation, i.e. the difference between job 
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We finally conduct a robust estimation which controls for outliers: the average 
negative correlation remains (table 3, column 4). 
 
4.1.2 Job creation in the new sector and the level and speed of reform 
Godoy and Stiglitz (2006) point out the importance of distinguishing between the 
effects of the level of “reform” (the extent of liberalization) and the speed of reform. 
They find a negative and significant coefficient for policy speed on the 1989-2001 
GDP growth differential among 23 transition countries. They interpret this result as 
evidence that countries that have adopted a gradual approach to reform have achieved 
higher prosperity than those which have adopted shock therapy. They use an average 
of the EBRD indices of small and large scale privatization as their measure of policy 
reform. 
Following Godoy and Stiglitz (2006), we also include the growth rate of the 
EBRD small and large privatization indices in estimations that include the levels9. We 
compute our measure of policy change both as the annual rate of change in the EBRD 
indices of small scale and large scale privatization and as the annual fraction of the 
1989-2005 differentials of the same indices. None of the measures is significant. In 
terms of private activity, countries that have adopted shock therapy do not seem to 
have been penalized relative to countries that have chosen a more gradualist approach 
to reform (see Table 4).  
We have repeated the same exercise for several EBRD indices: the index of 
enterprise restructuring; index of banking reform; index of market and trade; index of 
price liberalization; index of trade and forex system; and index of increased 
competition. None of these indices is relevant apart from the EBRD index of banking 
reform, which has a positive impact on private activity. While the level of reform is 
again significant, the speed of reform is not. The impact of the level of reform on 
private activity disappears as soon as we control for other variables in the estimation.  
 
4.1.3 Determinants of job creation in the private sector 
The negative correlation between unemployment and private activity remains even 
after controlling for initial conditions and policies affecting creation (see Table 5). 
                                                                                                                                            
creation and job destruction in the private sector. Results are very similar. 
9 When, as Godoy and Stiglitz (2006), we use the average of the EBRD indices of small scale and large 
scale privatization, we do not obtain any significant results. 
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Indeed, initial conditions do not seem relevant in explaining job creation in the new 
sector. None of the initial condition measures give satisfactory results. Three possible 
explanations might be considered: (1) our measures of initial conditions cannot 
capture the extent to which initial distortions in the allocation of resources affect the 
private sector; (2) as transition progresses, initial distortions become less important in 
explaining private sector growth; and (3) by including country fixed effects in our 
estimation, we control for country characteristics and indirectly for country initial 
conditions. 
Among policies affecting creation, the most relevant are money market rate 
(or lending rate) and corporate tax rate, stressing the importance of facilitating the 
access to credit for private sector entrepreneurs and stimulating private sector activity 
through favourable tax regimes. Favourable corporate taxation can also stimulate 
inflows of foreign capital in the region. This implication may also explain why in our 
estimations the coefficient on the share of FDI in GDP becomes insignificant as soon 
as we include corporate tax rate in our regression (see Table 5, column 7).  
Other relevant factors are the EBRD index of small scale privatization and the 
share of FDI in GDP. As seen above, the EBRD index of small scale privatization is 
likely to capture the progress in liberalization (and privatization) reform. Progress in 
liberalization is positive associated with job creation in the private sector. The share 
of FDI in GDP captures the importance of foreign capital and foreign activity for 
private sector growth. Since the beginning of transition, the role of foreign capital has 
been emphasised: Foreign investors were expected to bring about technological know-
how, organisational structure, management practises, and capital that will allow firms 
to restructure and become viable in a market environment. An extensive literature has 
documented these effects (see, e.g., Smarzynska Javorcik, 2004, 2006). We can also 
observe that countries that have opened up to foreign capital (e.g. Hungary, Estonia 
and the Czech Republic) have experienced higher levels of economic activity, reform 
and progress towards a well-functioning market economy. 
 
4.2 Job destruction in the old sector 
We now turn to analyse the determinants of job destruction in the old sector. As 
suggested by equation (1), job destruction in the old sector depends on initial 
conditions, the size of the state sector and policies affecting destruction: 
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 where Î is measured by the share of industry in employment, S is expressed as 
the share of non-private sector in GDP and Ď is measured by privatisation measures, 
the share of FDI in GDP and the share of trade in GDP.  
 
4.2.1 The role of different privatization methods 
Following Bennet et al. (2004), we can distinguish three alternative privatization 
methods. The first is full privatization, where the dominant form of privatization in an 
economy is the sale of firms for a positive price. The second is mass privatization, 
where the dominant form of privatization is that firms are sold at a zero (or nominal) 
price. The third category is mixed privatization, which covers all cases that are not 
adequately represented by either of the first two categories, and includes managers-
employee buyouts (MEBOs) and leased buyouts. Of the three methods, full 
privatization typically yields the most revenue, at least in the short run, while mass 
privatization yields the least.  
Dummy variables representing the three methods of privatization and the 
timing of privatization will be included in the job destruction equation. These 
dummies have both a cross-section and a time-series dimension. We specify the 
chosen method of privatization in each country as belonging to one of these three 
categories, and then identify the date in which this privatization method was 
introduced. This allows us to create three dummy variables, one for each method of 
privatization. In each case the dummy variable equals zero in the years before the 
relevant method of privatization was introduced and unity thereafter10. 
The privatization measure taken from Bennett et al. (2004) suggests that there 
is a positive correlation between full privatization method and job destruction in the 
state sector (see Table 6, column 2). As expected, full privatization method is positive 
correlated with job destruction in the state sector. Full privatization involves the sale 
of firms at a positive price and, more likely, leads to the participation of foreign 
capital in privatization. Foreign investors are more likely to engage in restructuring. 
There is also a positive correlation between mass privatization method and job 
                                                 
10 See Bennet et al., 2004 and Appendix D for details. 
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destruction, but this correlation disappears as soon as we replace time dummies with 
transition time dummies. 
We perform a robust check. The privatization measure taken from Bennett et 
al. (2004) contains cross-sectional and time-series elements that we want to 
distinguish. We first create three dummy variables indicating the chosen method of 
privatization. We then create a fourth dummy variable indicating the date in which the 
privatization method was introduced (Privatization period). As expected, job 
destruction in the state sector is higher during the process of privatization relative to 
the pre-privatization period. It is now apparent that the positive coefficient on full 
privatization method found in Table 6 column (3) combined the effect of full 
privatization with the timing of privatization (see Table 6 column 4). 
 
4.2.2 The role of reform and other privatization variables 
We also explore the impact of policy reform and other privatization variables on state 
firm downsizing: the EBRD indices of small scale and large scale privatization, and 
the share of privatization receipts in GDP. 
The EBRD indices of small scale and large scale privatization do not have any 
major impact on job destruction in the state sector. There is a weak positive effect of 
the large scale privatization index on job destruction. When we distinguish between 
the level and the speed of reform (measured by the level and the rate of change in the 
EBRD indices), our results do not change (see Table 6 column 1). The speed of 
reform does not affect job destruction in the state sector. We cannot claim that 
countries that have followed a more gradualist (or aggressive) approach to 
privatization have experience a higher rate of job destruction in the state sector 
relative to countries that have chosen a more aggressive (or gradualist) approach.  
The share of privatization receipts in GDP is highly positive correlated with 
job destruction in the state sector. Since countries that have adopted full privatization 
schemes are more likely to receive higher revenue for the selling of state assets at a 
nominal positive price; this finding may be another indication of the positive 
correlation between full privatization and state firm downsizing. Indeed, there is a 
high correlation between the full privatization dummy and the share of privatization 
receipts in GDP. 
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4.2.3 The determinants of job destruction in the state sector 
Looking at the steady-state relationship between unemployment and job destruction in 
the old sector, we find a positive correlation between unemployment and job 
destruction. A one per cent increase in unemployment is correlated with a 2 per cent 
increase in job destruction (see Table 7, column 1). By replacing unemployment with 
the share of unemployed in non-employed, the correlation does not change. 
Regarding our measure of initial distortions, we find that countries 
characterised by a more distorted initial allocation of resources towards industry and 
manufacturing (higher I) have lower job destruction in the old sector (see Tables 7, 
column 3). Contrary to the results obtained for job creation in private firms, initial 
conditions seem important in explaining job destruction in state-owned enterprises. 
Also, countries characterised by a larger share of non-private sector in GDP (higher 
S), have lower job destruction in the old sector. This last finding might be related to 
three alternative explanations. The larger the state sector the lower the job destruction 
in the state sector. The larger the state sector the more opposition to privatisation and 
firm restructuring by insiders that are afraid of loosing their jobs. The larger the state 
sector the higher the Government concern to avoid mass lay-offs and unmanageable 
level of unemployment benefits. This correlation, however, disappears when we 
include transition time instead of calendar time dummies. 
Full privatization method is still significant after controlling for initial 
distortions; it loses, however, its significance as we introduce our measure of political 
change in the estimation. We create a political change variable by (1) listing the 
political development in each country since 1989 for CEECs or 1991 for countries of 
the FSU; (2) identifying whether and when the country has embraced a semi-
presidential or parliamentary system; (3) distinguishing election years from non-
elections years and changes of the Head of State, either Prime Minister or President; 
(4) identifying the political orientation of the political party or, more frequently, the 
coalition which represents the majority in Parliament. 
For each country there is an election year that has brought a new coalition or a 
new president to power and represented the first clear political change from the past. 
We take that year as a sign of political change and we construct a dummy variable 
equal to 1 that year and the three years that follow. We choose four years because four 
is the average political cycle (years between two parliamentary elections) that has 
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emerged among CEECs and FSU republics since the collapse of communism11. For 
some countries (i.e. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary), this political change 
was at the very beginning of the transformation process, for others (i.e. Bulgaria and 
Romania) the first pro-reform government was elected much later12. 
In our estimations, results suggest that there is a positive and significant 
correlation between real political change variable and the rate of job destruction: 
controlling for initial conditions and privatization methods, job destruction is 2.6% 
higher during the four years of real political change than anytime before and after (see 
Table 7, column 6).  
Finally, we include the share of trade in GDP and we find surprisingly that 
country openness is negatively related to the downsizing of state firms. Perhaps old 
firms that can produce for Western markets have better chances to survive. 
Alternatively, firms that can produce for ex-partners of the COMECON have a better 
chance to delay restructuring. Either way the effect is negative (see Table 7, column 
7).  Since we can distinguish between the share of trade towards transition countries 
and the share of trade towards non-transition countries, we find that the share of trade 
towards transition countries is negatively associated with state firm downsizing. This 
confirms the idea that firms that can produce for ex-partners of the COMECON have 
a better chance to delay restructuring13. 
 
4.3 Unemployment as the outcome variable 
As suggested in section 2, potential endogeneity might affect the correlation between 
U and JCN. This potential endogeneity makes our interpretation of the impact of U on 
JCN problematic: the casual-effect correlation could go either way. Since we cannot 
solve the problem (i.e. find a valid instrument for U), we conduct estimations using 
unemployment (instead of JCN or JDS) as the outcome variable.  
Looking at the relationship between unemployment and the ‘level’ and ‘speed’ 
of reform, we find (consistently with previous results) that only the level and not the 
speed is relevant in explaining both log unemployment and the change in 
unemployment (see table 8). 
                                                 
11 We also experiment with five and three years: the results do not change. 
12 See Appendix E for details. 
13 See Repkine and Walsh (1999) for a similar intuition. 
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Looking at the relationship between unemployment, privatization, and the 
‘level’ and ‘speed’ of reform, we confirm the results obtained separately for JCN and 
JDS. Access to credit and foreign ownership are important factors in reducing 
unemployment. Progress of reform as measured by the level of the EBRD index of 
small scale privatization is important in reducing both log unemployment and the 
growth rate of unemployment. The EBRD index of large scale privatization has 
instead a positive effect on unemployment growth, but no effect on log 
unemployment. Full privatization is more likely to encourage restructuring than other 
privatization methods. Countries that adopted a full privatization method are more 
likely to experience higher unemployment, which we interpret as a consequence of 
deeper restructuring, than countries that have adopted mass or mixed privatization 
methods (see tables 9-10). 
We obtain similar results using either job flow rates or unemployment as the 
outcome variable. An important implication of this is that it gives validity to our 
constructed measures of job flows. As described in section 3, we construct rates of job 
flows using the Amadeus database. Since they are based on selected samples of firms, 
they might not be representative of the whole economy. In contrast, unemployment 
rates are collected from national statistics and are representative of the whole 
economy.  
 
4.4 An extension of the model 
An extension of the model which does distinguish between active or short-term 
unemployment (UA) and inactive or long-term unemployment (UNA) can exhibit path-
dependence. 
In this case, steady-state active unemployment is still determined 
independently of the path of unemployment. As suggested in equation (10), we 
estimate the relationship between short-term unemployment and job creation in the 
new sector: 
 
JCN = α ln(UA*)+ β Î + γ Ĉ + ε (17) 
 
Estimates of equation (17) follow very closely those obtained analysing the 
relationship between total unemployment and job creation in the new sector. There 
exists a negative association between active unemployment and job creation.  
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This extension of the model suggests that long-term or inactive unemployment 
depends on the history of active unemployment and, thus, on the pace and magnitude 
of job creation and destruction rates during the 1990s. We use the standard definition 
of long-term unemployment. Long-term unemployment rate is equal to the number of 
persons unemployed for a period of one year or beyond as a percentage of the labour 
force. Data on long-term unemployment have been retrieved from several sources: 
ILO Key Labour Market Indicators Database; Eurostat data; the OECD-CCNM 
database and the UNECE Statistical Division, OECD Database. Data for Russia and 
Ukraine have also been retrieved from National Statistical offices, namely Russian 
Federal State Statistics Service and State Statistics Committee of Ukraine.  Short-term 
unemployment rates have been computed as a difference between total unemployment 
and long-term unemployment rate. 
By transforming in logarithms and expressing empirical specifications of 
equations (13) and (14), we obtain: 
 
ln(UNA, t) =αi+ αt + δ0 ln(UA, t) + δ1 ln(UA, t-1) + δ2 ln(UA, t-2) +… + εt (18), 
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or, by simplifying notation, equation (19) can be expressed as: 
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Given specifications (18) and (20), we cannot assume that the residuals εt, εt-1  
and µt, µt-1 are uncorrelated over time. Under the assumption of correlation of the error 
terms, the fixed effects estimator is biased and inconsistent. We estimate equation 
(18) using a fixed effects model assuming either no residual autocorrelation or 
autocorrelation of order 1, i.e. AR(1), in the residuals. Results are provided in Tables 
11 and 12. The modified Bhargava et al. Durbin Watson test for panel data seems to 
confirm the presence of autocorrelation of AR(1) in the residuals. Results suggest that 
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there is path dependence of long-term unemployment on short-term unemployment: 
long-term unemployment depends on current and past values of short-term 
unemployment, and that this dependence fades away as soon as we reach time t-3. 
 
Conclusions 
High unemployment and inactivity rates characterize many CEECs and countries of 
the FSU today. Fifteen years into the transition, the problem of high joblessness has 
not been solved. Of the three explanations commonly discussed (i.e. ongoing 
reallocation; finished reallocation with redundant labour; wrong choice of institutional 
framework), we concentrated on the ongoing reallocation hypothesis.  
In this paper, we wanted to verify whether the high rate of unemployment 
today is a direct consequence of how the job reallocation process has occurred over 
time. More specifically, we wanted to look at the relationship between job creation, 
job destruction and unemployment. 
We found that there is a negative correlation between job creation in the 
private sector and unemployment. This negative correlation seems to be explained by 
lower consumption and, thus, lower aggregate demand: As workers lose their jobs and 
do not anticipate being re-employed in the new future, they reduce consumption, 
which also reduce aggregate demand in the economy. High unemployment then 
becomes an expression of a depressed economy. 
We found that long-term unemployment depends on current and past values of 
short-term unemployment and that this path-dependence fades away as soon as we 
reach time t-3. We interpreted this result as an indication that the process of 
reallocation started at the beginning of the 1990s still influences today’s labour 
market. A more difficult issue is to quantify the degree of influence of path-
dependence on the unemployment that we observe today.  
We explored the determinants of job creation and job destruction. We 
confirmed that lower corporate taxation, access to credit and foreign capital are 
crucial factors in stimulating private sector growth. We also found that job destruction 
depends on country initial conditions, the size of the state sector, political change and 
openness to trade.  
We addressed three components of the transition debate: shock therapy versus 
gradualism; privatization; and political change. Contrary to Godoy and Stiglitz 
(2006), we did not find gradualism superior to shock therapy in terms of private sector 
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growth. In addition, contrary to Bennett et al. (2004), we confirmed that full 
privatization is positively associated with job destruction in the state sector. Finally, 
we found that during early years of democratization the state sector was dismantled 
more vigorously than in other periods. 
We can identify several policy implications of our analysis. 
Path-dependence: being aware of the path-dependence of long-term 
unemployment on current and past values of active unemployment (i.e. job creation 
and destruction), transition countries should recognize where the limitations are, fix 
them where possible, and progress along the path of reform in order to conclude with 
the past and achieve a new level of development.  
Shock therapy versus gradualism: transition countries should focus on 
progressing along the path of reform. They do not need to worry about the speed of 
reform, but about the level that has been achieved so far. 
Privatization: Countries should apply full privatization methods if they want 
to achieve higher downsizing of state-owned enterprises. They should evaluate the 
necessary conditions (i.e. substantial domestic savings and developed capital markets) 
in order to avoid wealth stripping and concentration of money in the hands of few 
individuals. This recommendation can be extended to other developing countries in 
the process of adopting privatization schemes. 
Political change: If countries have embarked in a democratic process, they 
should do so definitely and consistently in order to give stability to the chosen 
political regime. As Persson and Tabellini (2006) point out, the consolidation of a 
democracy is a lengthy process, requiring citizens to learn how to cherish and respect 
democracy as a form of government. According to this definition, transition 
economies have too little experience so far with the democratic process to have 
accumulated a high amount of ‘democratic capital’. In addition, as suggested by 
Kornai (2006), countries should recognise that true democracy cannot be sustained 
without economic reforms because citizens will see higher inequality and high 
dispersion of resources brought about what leaders claim to be democracy (e.g., 
Russia is a good example). 
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Table 1 
Panel A: Unemployment rate (end-year) in per cent of labour force 
 BG HR CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO RU SL UA
1991 11.1 13.2 4.1 7.4 0.3 11.8 3 0 8.2 0
1992 15.3 13.2 2.6 9.3 3.9 1.3 14.3 8.2 5.3 8.3 0.2
1993 16.4 14.8 3.5 6.6 11.9 8.7 4.4 16.4 10.4 6 9.1 0.4
1994 12.8 14.5 4.4 7.6 10.7 16.7 3.8 16 10.1 7.8 9.1 0.4
1995 11.1 14.5 4.1 9.8 10.2 18.1 17.5 14.9 8.2 9 7.4 5.6
1996 12.5 10 3.9 10 9.9 19.4 16.4 13.2 6.5 9.9 7.3 7.6
1997 13.7 9.9 4.8 9.7 8.7 14.8 14.1 8.6 7.4 11.2 7.1 8.9
1998 16 11.4 6.4 9.8 7.8 14.1 13.2 10.2 10.4 12.3 7.6 11.3
1999 17 13.6 8.6 12.2 7 14.3 14.6 13.4 11.8 12.6 7.4 11.9
2000 16.4 16.1 8.7 13.6 6.4 14.4 16.4 16.4 10.5 10.2 7.6 11.7
2001 19.5 15.8 8.0 12.6 5.7 13.1 17.4 18.5 8.8 8.7 6.3 11.1
2002 16.8 14.8 7.3 10.3 5.8 12.4 13.8 19.8 8.4 8.8 6.4 10.2
2003 12.7 14.3 7.8 10 5.9 10.6 12.4 19.2 7.0 8.6 7.3 9.1
2004 12.0 13.8 8.3 9.7 6.3 10.4 11.4 19.1 6.3 8.5 6.8 
2005 10  7.9 9.4 7.3 9.9 7.2 17.8 5.9   
Note: Figures for 2005 are estimates. 
Source: EBRD, Transition Report (various issues), and ILO, Key Labour Market Indicators 
database. 
 
Panel B: Long-term unemployment rate (in per cent): unemployed for more than 1y 
 BG HR CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO RU SL UA 
1989             
1990             
1991   0.7 0.4 1.8        
1992   0.4 1.1 2.0   5.5  0.6  0.1
1993 8.8  0.7 1.9 4.1   6.2  0.7 5.1 0.5
1994 9  0.9 3.0 4.5   6.7 2.4 1.5 3.7 0.5
1995 7.8  1.1 3.1 5.0 9.6  6.2 2.5 2.2 3.9 0.6
1996 6.4 5.1 1.1 5.5 5.2 10  5.6 2.3 2.5 3.8 1.5
1997 8.4 4.8 1.3 4.4 4.2 8.8 8 5 2.5 4.1 3.6 2.6
1998 8 5.7 1.9 4.7 3.6 7.9 7.5 4.7 2.3 4.9 3.9 4.0
1999 8.3 6.8 3.1 5.6 3.4 7.6 5.3 5.8 2.8 5.8 3.5 5.3
2000 9.4 9.1 4.1 6.2 3.1 7.9 8 7.6 3.5 4.4 3.9 5.1
2001 11.9 8.9 4.2 6.1 2.7 7.2 9.2 9.3 3.2 3.3 3.2 4.5
2002 11.7 8.9 3.7 5.5 2.6 5.7 7.2 10.8 4 3.7 3.5 4.7
2003 8.9 8.4 3.8 4.7 2.4 4.3 6.1 10.8 4.2 3.9 3.4 4.4
2004 7.1 7.3 4.2 5.1 2.6 4.3 5.5 10.2 4.2 4.6 3.1  
Note: Long-term unemployment rate is defined as the number of unemployed in the labour 
force that are unemployed for more than 12 month. 
Source: EBRD, Transition Report (various issues); ILO, Key Labour Market Indicators 
database; Eurostat; the OECD-CCNM database; Russian Federal State Statistics Service; 
State Statistics Committee of Ukraine.  
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Table 2: Inactivity rates (in per cent) 
Panel A: 15-64 year old males and females 
 BG HR CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO RU SL UA 
1989 24.9 34.1 21.8 20.3 33.9 20.6 23.9 27.5 30.6 23.1 29.6 24.7
1990 25 34.1 21.9 20.8 34.3 21 24.2 27.9 30.9 23.5 29.9 25
1991 26.4 34.5 23.3 21.6 35.1 22.1 24.6 29.5 30.2 25 32.9 25.4
1992 27.7 34.7 25.2 23.1 35.4 23.4 25 31 29.4 27.3 35.9 25.8
1993 29.2 35 27.7 24.4 37.8 24.7 25.5 31.5 28.7 27.8 38.9 26.3
1994 30.8 35.2 27.5 25.9 39.7 26.4 25.9 32.4 28 28.4 32.8 27
1995 32.5 35.5 27.7 27.8 40.7 27.9 26.4 33.6 27.3 29 31.8 27.9
1996 34 35.5 28 28.1 41.1 30 27.1 34.1 29.3 30 32.5 26.9
1997 35.6 35.6 28.1 28.9 42 30.1 27.9 34.6 29.3 30.3 31.9 26.1
1998 37.3 35.6 28.1 28.4 41.8 31.1 27 34.9 30.8 30.7 30.9 25.3
1999 39.3 35.7 28 29 40.4 31.6 27.8 35.1 31 31.2 31.8 33.7
2000 41.2 35.7 28.5 29.6 40 32.8 28.6 35.2 31.2 30.8 32 32.9
2001 37.1 35.7 29 30.2 40.3 32.3 29.4 35.2 32.4 30.1 32.2 33.7
2002 37.6 35.6 29.3 31.1 40.3 31 30.3 36 36.3 29.5 31.3 33.7
2003 39 35.7 29.6 30.1 39.4 30.6 30.1 36.2 37.5 30.2 32.9 33.8
∆89-03 14.1 1.6 7.8 9.8 5.5 10 6.2 8.7 6.9 7.1 3.3 9.1
 
Panel B: 25-54 year old males and females 
 BG HR CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO RU SL UA
1989 6.4 17.9 4.9 5.1 15.4 5.6 6.8 14.1 15.5 6.1 12 6.2
1990 6.3 17.4 4.9 5.2 15.7 5.7 7 14.1 15.8 6.2 12.2 6.2
1991 7.1 17.3 6.2 5.7 16.4 6.7 7.3 14.6 15.2 7.4 13.8 6.9
1992 8 17.3 8.1 7 17.2 7.7 7.8 15.2 14.6 9.6 16 7.7
1993 9 17.1 10.6 8.3 19.2 8.8 8.2 14.8 14.2 10.4 18.2 8.7
1994 10.2 17.2 10.8 9.5 21 10.4 8.7 15.3 13.8 11.3 12.1 10
1995 11.5 17.1 10.8 11.4 22.5 11.8 9.2 15.9 13.4 12.3 11.2 11.6
1996 13 17.4 11.4 11.5 23 13.8 9.8 16.4 15 12.2 11.6 10.7
1997 14.7 17.6 11.4 12.4 24.2 13.4 10.6 17 15.2 12.4 13.5 9.9
1998 16.6 17.8 11.5 12 24.6 13.4 8.8 17.1 16.8 12.7 12.5 9.3
1999 18.8 18.1 11.4 12.6 22.9 13.9 9.3 17.2 17 13.1 12.4 15.8
2000 21.1 18.2 11.6 13.2 22.6 14.2 9.9 17.4 17.2 12.5 12.1 14.4
2001 17.9 18.4 11.5 14.1 22.9 13.8 10.4 17.5 18.4 12.1 11.8 15.1
2002 18.9 18.3 11.7 14.9 22.9 14.4 11 17.9 21.4 11.9 11.2 15.8
2003 21.1 18.3 12.1 14.3 22 13.8 11.1 18 22 12.4 12.3 16.1
∆89-03 14.7 0.4 7.2 9.2 6.6 8.2 4.3 3.9 6.5 6.3 0.3 9.9
Source: ILO, Key Labour Market Indicators database.  
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Table 3: The relationship between job creation in the private sector and unemployment rate 
Dep. Var.: Job creation in the new sector (1) 
Fixed-effects 
(2) 
Fixed-effects 
(3) 
Robust estimation 
Log(U) -.138*** 
(.038) 
 -.084*** 
(.023) 
Log(U)*group A  -.193*** 
(.040) 
 
Log(U)*group B   .108 
(.085) 
 
Adj-R2 0.77 0.80  
No. of observations 92 92 91 
Log(Unemployed/Non-employed) -.207*** 
(.045) 
 -.115*** 
(.028) 
Log(Unemployed/Non-employed)*group A  -.222*** 
(.051) 
 
Log(Unemployed/Non-employed)*group B   -.153* 
(.090) 
 
Adj-R2 0.79 0.79  
No. of observations 92 92 92 
Note: All estimations include country and transition time dummies.  
Columns (2) and (3) split the sample of countries in group A and group B. Group A consists of early-reforming countries such as Estonia, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania. Group B consists of late-reforming countries such as Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, Ukraine and Croatia.  
Column (3) reports robust estimates which control for outliers and use Huber weights and Biweights until convergence. 
Column (4) reports IV estimates obtained using privatization variables (full privatization, mass privatization and mixed privatization) and other exogenous 
variables as instruments for Log(U). 
Testing whether Group A and Group B coefficients are the same (hypothesis Ho): the Ho is rejected in the case of unemployment; Ho is accepted in the case 
of unemployment as a share of non-employment.
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Table 4: The relationship between job creation in the private sector and the ‘level’ and ‘speed’ of reform 
Dep. Var.: Job creation in the new sector (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Log(U)  -.086*** 
(.03) 
  -.085*** 
(.031) 
  -.083*** 
(.031) 
 
Log(Unemployed/Non-employed)   -.117*** 
(.037) 
  -.120*** 
(.039) 
  -.115*** 
(.039) 
EBRD index of small privatization  .184*** 
(.024) 
.167*** 
(.023) 
.158*** 
(.024) 
.184*** 
(.027) 
.163*** 
(.026) 
.152*** 
(.027) 
.192*** 
(.027) 
.171*** 
(.027) 
.16*** 
(.028) 
EBRD index of large privatization  .015 
(.022) 
.021 
(.021) 
.013 
(.021) 
.008 
(.025) 
.019 
(.024) 
.014 
(.023) 
.001 
(.026) 
.010 
(.025) 
.005 
(.025) 
Rate of change in the EBRD index of small 
privatization 
   -.017 
(.038) 
.003 
(.037) 
.022 
(.046) 
  -.027 
(.091) 
Rate of change in the EBRD index of large 
privatization 
   .016 
(.05) 
.019 
(.024) 
.013 
(.037) 
  .029 
(.065) 
Yearly fraction of the 1989-2005 EBRD index 
of small privatization differential 
      -.083 
(.094) 
-.047 
(.091) 
 
Yearly fraction of the 1989-2005 EBRD index 
of large privatization differential 
      .022 
(.069) 
.028 
(.066) 
 
Adj-R2 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.87 
No. of observations 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 
Note: All estimations include country and transition time dummies. Estimates are equivalent to fixed-effects estimates. 
Privatization dummies are full privatization, mass privatization and mixed privatization; the benchmark being mixed privatization. 
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Table 5: The determinants of job creation in the private sector 
Dep. Var.: Job creation in the new sector (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Log(U) -.136*** 
(.038) 
-.154*** 
(.035) 
-.156*** 
(.037) 
-.144*** 
(.035) 
-.147*** 
(.034) 
-.098*** 
(.028) 
-.09*** 
(.024) 
 
Log(Short-term unemployment)        -.074*** 
(.024) 
Share of industry in employment -.589 
(.501) 
       
Money Market rate  -.20*** 
(.049) 
 -.201*** 
(.049) 
-.165*** 
(.05) 
-.135*** 
(.044) 
-.067* 
(.037) 
-.064* 
(.038) 
Lending rate    -.18*** 
(.059) 
     
Trade share in GDP    .087 
(.062) 
    
FDI share in GDP     .806** 
(.336) 
.522* 
(.280) 
.166 
(.248) 
.061 
(.26) 
EBRD index of small privatization       .138*** 
(.023) 
.141*** 
(.02) 
.141*** 
(.021) 
EBRD index of large privatization       -.023 
(.023) 
  
Corporate tax rate       -.537*** 
(.123) 
-.533*** 
(.138) 
Adj-R2 0.77 0.81 0.78 0.82 0.83 0.89 0.92 0.90 
No. of observations 92 92 92 92 92 92 91 85 
Note: All estimations include country and transition time dummies. Estimates are equivalent to fixed-effects estimates. 
Privatization dummies are full privatization, mass privatization and mixed privatization; the benchmark being mixed privatization. 
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Table 6: The determinants of job destruction in the old sector: Privatization variables 
Dep. Var.: Job destruction  in the old sector (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
EBRD index of small scale privatisation -.01 
(.008) 
    
EBRD index of large scale privatisation .015* 
(.008) 
    
Rate of change in the EBRD index of small privatization .018 
(.011) 
    
Rate of change in the EBRD index of large privatization -.020 
(.013) 
    
Full privatization method  .106*** 
(.021) 
.053** 
(.022) 
  
Mass privatization method  .092*** 
(.014) 
.018 
(.020) 
  
Mixed Privatization method  .025 
(.016) 
.024 
(.016) 
  
Full privatization dummy    .025* 
(.013) 
 
Mass privatization dummy    .015 
(.014) 
 
Privatization period    .026** 
(.013) 
 
Share of Privatization receipts in GDP     .642*** 
(.229) 
Country dummies √ √ √ √ √ 
Transition time dummies √  √ √ √ 
Year dummies  √    
Adj-R2 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.48 .48 
No. of observations 134 134 134 134 129 
Note: All estimations include country dummy variables and calendar time or transition time dummies. 
Privatization dummies are full privatization dummy, mass privatization dummy and mixed privatization dummy: mixed privatization dummy is the 
benchmark in column (4). 
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Table 7: The determinants of job destruction in the old sector 
Dep. Var.: Job destruction  in the old sector (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log(U) .018*** 
(.006) 
       
Log(Unemployed/Non-employed)  .021*** 
(.006) 
      
Non-private sector share in GDP    -.083* 
(.049) 
.032 
(.039) 
    
Share of industry in employment     -528*** 
(.161) 
.-545*** 
(.167) 
-.577*** 
(.158) 
-.407*** 
(.157) 
Full  privatization method      .062*  
(.031) 
.038 
(.031) 
.044 
(.029) 
Mass privatization method      .018 
(.022) 
.005 
(.021) 
.009 
(.02) 
Mixed privatization method      .014 
(.015) 
.009 
(.015) 
.009 
(.014) 
Real political change       .026*** 
(.008) 
.022*** 
(.007) 
Share of trade in GDP        -.075*** 
(.021) 
Country dummies √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Transition time dummies √ √  √ √ √ √ √ 
Year dummies   √      
Adj-R2 0.51 0.52 0.32 0.47 0.52 0.53 0.57 0.62 
No. of observations 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 
Note: All estimations include country and calendar time or transition time dummies. 
Privatization dummies are full privatization dummy, mass privatization dummy and mixed privatization dummy: mixed privatization dummy is the 
benchmark in column (2). 
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Table 8: The relationship between unemployment and the ‘level’ and ‘speed’ of reform 
 Log(Unemployment) ∆Log(Unemployment) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
EBRD index of small privatization  .259** 
(.105) 
.273** 
(.110) 
.302** 
(.116) 
.-301*** 
(.091) 
-.338*** 
(.091) 
-.327*** 
(.100) 
EBRD index of large privatization  -.102 
(.112) 
-.149 
(.125) 
-.207 
(.129) 
.155* 
(.088) 
.193** 
(.095) 
.152 
(.102) 
Rate of change in the EBRD index of small privatization  -.005 
(.158) 
  .335*** 
(.126) 
 
Rate of change in the EBRD index of large privatization  .192 
(.175) 
  .151 
(.141) 
 
Yearly fraction of the 1989-2005 EBRD index of small 
privatization differential 
  -.172 
(.342) 
  .221 
(.282) 
Yearly fraction of the 1989-2005 EBRD index of large 
privatization differential 
  .550* 
(336) 
  .141 
(.271) 
Adj-R2 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.41 0.44 0.4 
No. of observations 178 178 178 168 168 168 
Note: All estimations include country and transition time dummies. Estimates are equivalent to fixed-effects estimates.  
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Table 9: The relationship between unemployment, privatization, and political change 
 Log(Unemployment) ∆Log(Unemployment) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Full privatization method .757** 
(.310) 
.263 
(.236) 
   .403* 
(.228) 
.065 
(.215) 
   
Mass privatization method 1.54*** 
(.302) 
.376 
(.272) 
   -.599** 
(.247) 
-.624** 
(.273) 
   
Mixed Privatization method -.659** 
(.270) 
-.749*** 
(.216) 
   .656* 
(.192) 
.275 
(.193) 
   
Full privatization dummy   .627*** 
(.195) 
    .158 
(.153) 
  
Mass privatization dummy   .493** 
(.215) 
    .321* 
(.168) 
  
Privatization period   -.204 
(.178) 
    .051 
(.149) 
  
Share of privatization receipts in GDP    3.26 
(3.69) 
    -.285 
(.280) 
 
Real political change     -.005 
(.107) 
    .043 
(.084) 
Country dummies √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Transition time dummies  √ √ √ √  √ √ √ √ 
Year dummies √     √     
Adj-R2 0.62 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.40 0.37 
No. of observations 180 180 180 171 180 168 168 168 160 168 
Note: All estimations include country dummy variables and calendar time or transition time dummies. 
Privatization dummies are full privatization dummy, mass privatization dummy and mixed privatization dummy: mixed privatization dummy is the 
benchmark in columns (3) and (8). 
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Table 10: The relationship between unemployment, privatization and the ‘speed’ and ‘level’ of reform 
 Log(Unemployment) ∆Log(Unemployment) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Share of industry in employment .457 
(1.97) 
   -1.25 
(1.91)    
   
Lending rate .061*** 
(.021) 
.082*** 
(.022) 
.083*** 
(.022) 
.090*** 
(.021) 
-.053** 
(.022) 
-.039* 
(.020) 
-.033 
(.022) 
-.039* 
(.021) 
FDI share in GDP 2.53* 
(1.47) 
2.39* 
(1.22) 
2.35* 
(1.23) 
2.33* 
(1.16) 
-.105 
(1.44) 
.492 
(1.12) 
.376 
(1.14) 
.314 
(1.14) 
EBRD index of small privatization   -.257** 
(.102) 
-.248** 
(.108) 
-.276*** 
(.097) 
 -.380*** 
(095) 
-.342*** 
(.103) 
-.377*** 
(.097) 
EBRD index of large privatization   -.060 
(.102) 
-.056 
(.107) 
-.047 
(.090) 
 .178* 
(.094) 
.222** 
(100) 
.249*** 
(.089) 
Rate of change in the EBRD index of small 
privatization 
 -.119 
(.222) 
   -.532** 
(.209) 
  
Rate of change in the EBRD index of large 
privatization 
 -.067 
(.142) 
   -.051 
(.141) 
  
Yearly fraction of the 1989-2005 EBRD index of small 
privatization differential 
  -.067 
(.301) 
   -.340 
(.294) 
 
Yearly fraction of the 1989-2005 EBRD index of large 
privatization differential 
  -.034 
(.262) 
   -.045 
(.249) 
 
Full  privatization dummy    .676*** 
(.139) 
   -.102 
(.136) 
Mass privatization dummy    .159 
(.146) 
   .110 
(.174) 
Privatization period    -.545*** 
(.153) 
   .030 
(.154) 
Adj-R2 0.63 0.56 0.56 0.68 0.28 0.4 0.37 0.37 
No. of observations 149 155 155 156 146 153 153 153 
Note: All estimations include country and calendar time or transition time dummies. Privatization dummies are full privatization dummy, mass privatization 
dummy and mixed privatization dummy: mixed privatization dummy is the benchmark in columns (4) and (8). 
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Table 11: The relationship between long-term unemployment and short-term unemployment, Fixed effect estimation 
Dep. Var.: Long-term unemployment growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
L(UA, t) .549*** .480*** .473*** .464*** .394** .363** 
L(UA, t-1) .456*** .652*** .657*** .665*** .615*** .525** 
L(UA, t-2)  .114 .299** .261 .387* .430** 
L(UA, t-3)   -.020 .149 -.024 .003 
L(UA, t-4)    .030 .271* .132 
L(UA, t-5)     -.062 .233* 
L(UA, t-6)      -.116 
Adj-R2 .85 .84 .83 .83 .84 .87 
No. of observations 119 108 97 86 75 64 
Note: Results of estimation of: ∆log(UNA)t =α+ δ0 log(UA, t) + δ1 log(UA, t-1) + δ2 log(UA, t-2) +  δ3 log(UA, t-3) +…+ αi + εt 
Table 12: The relationship between long-term unemployment and short-term unemployment, Fixed effect estimation with AR(1) residuals 
Dep. Var.: Long-term unemployment growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
L(UA, t) .206** .182* .163 .188* .200* 
L(UA, t-1) .437*** .548*** .586*** .531*** .452*** 
L(UA, t-2)  .161* .071 .153 .170 
L(UA, t-3)   -.012 -.045 -.037 
L(UA, t-4)    .142* .047 
L(UA, t-5)     .048 
L(UA, t-6)      
Adj-R2 .39 .42 .43 .58 .47 
No. of observations 108 97 86 75 64 
No. of groups 11 11 11 11 11 
Modified Bhargava et al. Durbin-Watson .638 .635 .714 .657 .683 
Baltagi-Wu LBI .982 .949 1.0 1.03 1.25 
Note: Results of estimation of: ∆log(UNA)t =α+ δ0 log(UA, t) + δ1 log(UA, t-1) + δ2 log(UA, t-2) +  δ3 log(UA, t-3) +…+ αi + εt + ρεt-1 + ηt 
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Appendix A: Data Sources 
 
Table A.1: Job Creation in the new sector: Data Sources 
Country Firm type Data Source Time period 
Bulgaria Foreign  Markov and Dobrinsky(2005) and 
Amadeus 
1993-2003 
Czech Republic New Sector Jurajda & Terrell (2002) 1991-1996 
Estonia New Sector  
Foreign  
Haltiwanger & Vodopivec (2002), 
Amadeus 
1989-1994 
1995-2003 
Hungary Foreign Korosi (2001) 1991-2002 
Latvia Foreign Amadeus 1996-2003 
Lithuania Foreign Amadeus 1998-2003 
Poland Foreign Amadeus 1994-2003 
Romania Foreign Korosi and Turlea (2005) and 
Amadeus 
1995-2003 
Ukraine Foreign Amadeus 1999-2003 
Russia Foreign Amadeus 1999-2003 
 
 
Table A.2: Job Destruction in the Old Sector: Data Sources 
Country Data source Time period 
Bulgaria Markov and Dobrinsky (2005) and Amadeus 1993-2003 
Czech Republic 
 
Jurajda & Terrell (2001) 
Amadeus 
1991-1996 
1997-1999 
Estonia Haltiwanger & Vodopivec (2002), Masso(2005) 
Amadeus 
1991-1994 
1995-2003 
Hungary Korosi (2001) 1991-2003 
Latvia Amadeus 1994-2003 
Lithuania Amadeus 1996-2003 
Poland 
 
Konings, Lehman & Schaffer (1996) 
Amadeus 
1989-1991 
1992-2003 
Romania Korosi and Turlea (2005) and Amadeus 1995-2003 
Ukraine Amadeus: linear interpolations 
Brown & Earle (2004) 
1991-1992 
1993-2000 
Russia Browne & Earle (2002) 1989-2002 
Slovenia Bojnec & Konings (1998) 
Amadeus  
1991-1993 
(1994-2003) 
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Table A.3: Share of foreign-owned firms in total firms, Amadeus data base 
 
 BG HR EE LT LV PO RO HA RU
1994 8.0         
1995 8.1    42.2     
1996 8.9   12.3 45.3  19.2   
1997 9.0 22.6 46.2 15.3 42.7 28.4 22.4   
1998 10.0 19.5 41.5 17.1 41.9 28.9 23.9   
1999 10.3 20.0 40.6 16.2 42.3 29.0 26.2 3.6 8.7
2000 5.8 20.9 40.8 19.2 42.8 31.8 28.4 3.9 9.8
2001 6.4 21.3 39.4 18.7 43.1 32.2 30.2 3.1 9.3
2002 6.3 22.0 39.9 19.3 42.5 31.9 30.4 3.7 8.1
2003 6.6 22.4 36.4 18.1 40.3 31.5 30.6 4.0 8.1
Source: Amadeus data base. 
Note: the shares for Bulgaria and Poland are derived by using the Amadeus October 2003 
(data until 1999) sample and the Amadeus January 2005 sample.  
 
 
Most of the variables used in the statistical analysis were retrieved from the following 
databases:  
 
1. EBRD, Transition Report, Statistical Annex. 
2. ILO, Key Labour Market Indicators database;  
3. Eurostat;  
4. the OECD-CCNM database;  
5. Russian Federal State Statistics Service;  
6. Estonian Statistical Office; 
7. State Statistics Committee of Ukraine. 
 
The Corporate Tax Rates were constructed using the following sources: 
 
Bellak, C., Leibrecht, M. (2005), ‘Do Low Corporate Income Tax Rates Attract FDI? Evidence 
from Eight Central- and East European Countries’, GEP Research Paper 2005/43. 
Brandmeier, M. (2006), ‘Impact of Corporate Tax Rates on German FDI Stock in the New 
EU Member States’, IWW Discussion Paper No. 01-2006. 
Edwards, C. (2005), ‘Catching Up to Global Tax Reforms’, Cato Institute Tax & Budget 
Bulletin No.28, November 2005. 
Edwards, C. (2006), ‘The Need for Tax Reform and the Possibility of a Flat Tax for the 
District of Columbia’, Statement before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 
Subcommittee on the District of Columbia, March 8, 2006. 
Eurostat (2005), ‘Structures of the taxation systems in the EU’, Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg. 
Finfacts Ireland Business and Finance Portal (2005), ‘Taxation in the EU from 1995 to 2003’, 
October 21, 2005. 
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Appendix B 
Job destruction and job creation rates in the new sector 
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Source: Markov and Dobrinsky (2005) and Amadeus foreign-owned firms.
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Source: Jurajda and Terrell (2002).
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Appendix C 
Job destruction and job creation rates in the old sector 
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Appendix D 
 
Table D.1: Country Privatization Nomenclature 
 
Country Classification 
of 
Privatization 
Year of 
Privatization 
Primary 
Method 
Secondary 
Method 
Bulgaria Full 1993 Direct sales Vouchers 
Croatia Mixed 1992 MEBO Vouchers 
Czech 
Republic 
Mass 1992 Vouchers Direct sales 
Estonia Full 1993 Direct sales Vouchers 
Hungary Full 1990 Direct sales MEBO 
Latvia Full 1992 Direct sales Vouchers 
Lithuania Mass 1991 Vouchers Direct sales 
Poland Full 1990 Direct sales MEBO 
Romania Mixed 1992 MEBO Direct sales 
Russia Mass 1993 Vouchers Direct sales 
Slovenia Mixed 1998 MEBO Vouchers 
Ukraine Mass 1994 Vouchers MEBO 
 
Source: Bennett et al. (2004). 
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Appendix E 
Table E.1: Political change variable 
 
Year 
Political  
variable Country Elections Prime minister/President (bold)
Political  
party Affiliation System 
1989  Bulgaria 0 Georgi Atanasov BSP left  
1990 0 Bulgaria 1 Andrey Lukanov BSP left  
1991 0 Bulgaria 1 Dimitar Iliev Popov no party no party Parliamentary 
1992 0 Bulgaria 0 Filip Dimitrov UDF centre-right Parliamentary 
1993 0 Bulgaria 0 Lyuben Berov technocratic team techno Parliamentary 
1994 0 Bulgaria 1 Lyuben Berov technocratic team techno Parliamentary 
1995 0 Bulgaria 0 Zhan Videnov BSP left parliamentary 
1996 0 Bulgaria 0 Zhan Videnov BSP left parliamentary 
1997 1 Bulgaria 1 Stefan Sofiyanski / Ivan Kostov UDF centre-right parliamentary 
1998 1 Bulgaria 0 Ivan Kostov UDF centre-right parliamentary 
1999 1 Bulgaria 0 Ivan Kostov UDF centre-right parliamentary 
2000 1 Bulgaria 0 Ivan Kostov UDF centre-right parliamentary 
2001 0 Bulgaria 1 Simeon Sakskoburggotski NMSII centre-right parliamentary 
2002 0 Bulgaria 0 Simeon Sakskoburggotski NMSII centre-right parliamentary 
2003 0 Bulgaria 0 Simeon Sakskoburggotski NMSII centre-right parliamentary 
2004 0 Bulgaria 0 Simeon Sakskoburggotski NMSII centre-right parliamentary 
2005 0 Bulgaria 1 Sergey Stanishev BSP left parliamentary 
2006 0 Bulgaria 0 Sergey Stanishev BSP left parliamentary 
1989 0 Croatia 0     
1990 0 Croatia 1 Franjo Tudman HDZ right semi-parliament 
1991 0 Croatia 0 Franjo Tudman HDZ right semi-parliament 
1992 0 Croatia 0 Franjo Tudman HDZ right semi-parliament 
1993 0 Croatia 0 Franjo Tudman HDZ right semi-parliament 
1994 0 Croatia 0 Franjo Tudman HDZ right semi-parliament 
1995 1 Croatia 1 Franjo Tudman HDZ right semi-parliament 
1996 1 Croatia 0 Franjo Tudman HDZ right semi-parliament 
1997 1 Croatia 0 Franjo Tudman HDZ right semi-parliament 
1998 1 Croatia 0 Franjo Tudman HDZ right semi-parliament 
1999 0 Croatia 0 Franjo Tudman HDZ right semi-parliament 
2000 0 Croatia 1 Stjepan Mesic SDP centre-left parliamentary 
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2001 0 Croatia 0 Stjepan Mesic SDP centre-left parliamentary 
2002 0 Croatia 0 Stjepan Mesic SDP centre-left parliamentary 
2003 0 Croatia 1 Stjepan Mesic HDZ centre-right parliamentary 
2004 0 Croatia 0 Stjepan Mesic HDZ centre-right parliamentary 
2005 0 Croatia 1 Stjepan Mesic HDZ centre-right parliamentary 
2006 0 Croatia 0 Stjepan Mesic    
1989 0 Czechoslovakia     
1990 1 Czechoslovakia Petr Pitahrt  centre-right parliamentary 
1991 1 Czechoslovakia Petr Pitahrt  centre-right parliamentary 
1992 1 Czechoslovakia Vaclav Klaus CDP centre-right parliamentary 
1993 1 Czech Republic 0 Vaclav Klaus CDP centre-right parliamentary 
1994 0 Czech Republic 0 Vaclav Klaus CDP centre-right parliamentary 
1995 0 Czech Republic 0 Vaclav Klaus CDP centre-right parliamentary 
1996 0 Czech Republic 1 Vaclav Klaus CDP centre-right parliamentary 
1997 0 Czech Republic 0 Josef Tovosky CDP centre-right parliamentary 
1998 0 Czech Republic 1 Milos Zeman CSDP+CDP centre-left parliamentary 
1999 0 Czech Republic 0 Milos Zeman CSDP+CDP centre-left parliamentary 
2000 0 Czech Republic 0 Milos Zeman CSDP+CDP centre-left parliamentary 
2001 0 Czech Republic 0 Milos Zeman CSDP+CDP centre-left parliamentary 
2002 0 Czech Republic 1 Vladimir Spidla CSDP centre-left parliamentary 
2003 0 Czech Republic 0 Vladimir Spidla CSDP centre-left parliamentary 
2004 0 Czech Republic 0 Stanisalv Gross CSDP centre-left parliamentary 
2005 0 Czech Republic 0 Jiri Paroubek CSDP centre-left parliamentary 
2006 0 Czech Republic 1 Mirek Topolanek CDP centre-right parliamentary 
1989 0 Estonia      
1990 0 Estonia  Edgar Savisaar Estonian Centre Party centre-left  
1991 0 Estonia 0 Edgar Savisaar Estonian Centre Party centre-left  
1992 1 Estonia 1 Mart Laar Fatherland centre-right parliamentary 
1993 1 Estonia 0 Mart Laar Fatherland centre-right parliamentary 
1994 1 Estonia 0 Andres Tarand socialist centre-left parliamentary 
1995 1 Estonia 1 Tiit Vähi Estonian Coalition party centre-left parliamentary 
1996 0 Estonia 0 Tiit Vähi Estonian Coalition party centre-left parliamentary 
1997 0 Estonia 0 Mart Siimann Estonian Coalition party centre-left parliamentary 
1998 0 Estonia 0 Mart Siimann Estonian Coalition party centre-left parliamentary 
1999 0 Estonia 1 Mart Laar Fatherland centre-right parliamentary 
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2000 0 Estonia 0 Mart Laar Fatherland centre-right parliamentary 
2001 0 Estonia 0 Mart Laar Fatherland centre-right parliamentary 
2002 0 Estonia 0 Siim Kallas Liberal Estonian Reform Party centre-right parliamentary 
2003 0 Estonia 1 Juhan Parts Res Publica Party centre-right parliamentary 
2004 0 Estonia 0 Juhan Parts Res Publica Party centre-right parliamentary 
2005 0 Estonia 0 Juhan Parts Res Publica Party centre-right parliamentary 
2006 0 Estonia 0 Andrus Ansip Liberal Estonian Reform Party centre-right parliamentary 
1989 0 Hungary      
1990 1 Hungary 1 Jozsef Antall MDF centre-right parliamentary 
1991 1 Hungary 0 Jozsef Antall MDF centre-right parliamentary 
1992 1 Hungary 0 Jozsef Antall MDF centre-right parliamentary 
1993 1 Hungary 0 Peter Boross MDF centre-right parliamentary 
1994 0 Hungary 1 Gyula Horn MSZP centre-left parliamentary 
1995 0 Hungary 0 Gyula Horn MSZP centre-left parliamentary 
1996 0 Hungary 0 Gyula Horn MSZP centre-left parliamentary 
1997 0 Hungary 0 Gyula Horn MSZP centre-left parliamentary 
1998 0 Hungary 1 Viktor Orban Fidesz centre-right parliamentary 
1999 0 Hungary 0 Viktor Orban Fidesz centre-right parliamentary 
2000 0 Hungary 0 Viktor Orban Fidesz centre-right parliamentary 
2001 0 Hungary 0 Viktor Orban Fidesz centre-right parliamentary 
2002 0 Hungary 1 Peter Medgyessy MSZP centre-left parliamentary 
2003 0 Hungary 0 Peter Medgyessy MSZP centre-left parliamentary 
2004 0 Hungary 0 Ferenc Gyurcsany MSZP centre-left parliamentary 
2005 0 Hungary 0 Ferenc Gyurcsany MSZP centre-left parliamentary 
2006 0 Hungary 1 Ferenc Gyurcsany MSZP centre-left parliamentary 
1989 0 Latvia      
1990 0 Latvia 0 Ivars Godmanis Latvian People's Front right parliamentary 
1991 0 Latvia 0 Ivars Godmanis Latvian People's Front right parliamentary 
1992 0 Latvia 0 Ivars Godmanis Latvian People's Front right parliamentary 
1993 1 Latvia 1 Valdis Birkavs Latvian Way centre-right parliamentary 
1994 1 Latvia 0 Maris Gailis Latvian Way centre-right parliamentary 
1995 1 Latvia 1 Andris Skele   parliamentary 
1996 1 Latvia 0 Andris Skele   parliamentary 
1997 0 Latvia 0 Guntars Krasts for Fatherland and Freedom right parliamentary 
1998 0 Latvia 1 Vilis Kristopans Latvian Way centre-right parliamentary 
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1999 0 Latvia 0 Andris Skele People's Party centre-right parliamentary 
2000 0 Latvia 0 Andris Berzins Latvian Way centre-right parliamentary 
2001 0 Latvia 0 Andris Berzins Latvian Way centre-right parliamentary 
2002 0 Latvia 1 Einars Repse New Era Party centre-right parliamentary 
2003 0 Latvia 0 Einars Repse New Era Party centre-right parliamentary 
2004 0 Latvia 0 Indulus Emsis Green Party left parliamentary 
2005 0 Latvia 0 Aigars Kalvitis People's Party centre-right parliamentary 
2006 0 Latvia 1 Aigars Kalvitis People's Party centre-right parliamentary 
1989 0 Lithuania      
1990 0 Lithuania 0 Kazimira Prunskiene Sajudis multi-party semi-presidential
1991 0 Lithuania 0 Albertas Simenas Sajudis multi-party semi-presidential
1992 1 Lithuania 1 Bronislovas Lubys none left semi-presidential
1993 1 Lithuania 0 Adolfas Slezevicius lithuanian democratic labour party left semi-presidential
1994 1 Lithuania 0 Adolfas Slezevicius lithuanian democratic labour party left semi-presidential
1995 1 Lithuania 0 Adolfas Slezevicius lithuanian democratic labour party left semi-presidential
1996 0 Lithuania 1 Gediminas Vagnorius Homeland Union/Conservatives centre-right semi-presidential
1997 0 Lithuania 0 Gediminas Vagnorius Homeland Union/Conservatives centre-right semi-presidential
1998 0 Lithuania 0 Gediminas Vagnorius Homeland Union/Conservatives centre-right semi-presidential
1999 0 Lithuania 0 Gediminas Vagnorius Homeland Union/Conservatives centre-right semi-presidential
2000 0 Lithuania 1 Rolandas Paksas Liberal Union centre-right semi-presidential
2001 0 Lithuania 0 Algirdas Brazauskas Social Democratic Party centre-left semi-presidential
2002 0 Lithuania 0 Algirdas Brazauskas Social Democratic Party centre-left semi-presidential
2003 0 Lithuania 0 Algirdas Brazauskas Social Democratic Party centre-left semi-presidential
2004 0 Lithuania 1 Algirdas Brazauskas Social Democratic Party centre-left semi-presidential
2005 0 Lithuania 0 Algirdas Brazauskas Social Democratic Party centre-left semi-presidential
2006 0 Lithuania 0 Gediminas Kirkilas Social Democratic Party centre-left semi-presidential
1989 0 Poland 0 Tadeusz Mazowiecki  centre-left  
1990 1 Poland 0 Jan Krzysztof Bielecki  centre-right parliamentary 
1991 1 Poland 1 Jan Olszewski  right parliamentary 
1992 1 Poland 0 Hanna Suchocka  centre-left parliamentary 
1993 1 Poland 1 Waldemar Pawlak SLD left parliamentary 
1994 0 Poland 0 Waldemar Pawlak SLD left parliamentary 
1995 0 Poland 0 Jozef Oleksy SLD left parliamentary 
1996 0 Poland 0 Wlodzimier Cimoszewicz SLD left parliamentary 
1997 0 Poland 1 Jerzy Buzek RS AWS right parliamentary 
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1998 0 Poland 0 Jerzy Buzek RS AWS right parliamentary 
1999 0 Poland 0 Jerzy Buzek RS AWS right parliamentary 
2000 0 Poland 0 Jerzy Buzek RS AWS right parliamentary 
2001 0 Poland 1 Leszek Miller SLD centre-left parliamentary 
2002 0 Poland 0 Leszek Miller SLD centre-left parliamentary 
2003 0 Poland 0 Leszek Miller SLD centre-left parliamentary 
2004 0 Poland 0 Marek Belka SLD centre-left parliamentary 
2005 0 Poland 1 Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz Law and Justice (PiS) centre-right parliamentary 
2006 0 Poland 0 Jaroslaw Kaczynski Law and Justice (PiS) centre-right parliamentary 
1989 0 Slovenia      
1990 1 Slovenia 1 Ljze Peterle Christian Democrats centre-right parliamentary 
1991 1 Slovenia 0 Ljze Peterle Christian Democrats centre-right parliamentary 
1992 1 Slovenia 1 Janez Drnovsek Liberal Democrats centre-right parliamentary 
1993 1 Slovenia 0 Janez Drnovsek Liberal Democrats centre-right parliamentary 
1994 0 Slovenia 0 Janez Drnovsek Liberal Democrats centre-right parliamentary 
1995 0 Slovenia 0 Janez Drnovsek Liberal Democrats centre-right parliamentary 
1996 0 Slovenia 1 Janez Drnovsek Liberal Democrats centre-right parliamentary 
1997 0 Slovenia 0 Janez Drnovsek Liberal Democrats centre-right parliamentary 
1998 0 Slovenia 0 Janez Drnovsek Liberal Democrats centre-right parliamentary 
1999 0 Slovenia 0 Janez Drnovsek Liberal Democrats centre-right parliamentary 
2000 0 Slovenia 1 Andrej Bajuk New Slovenia Christian People's Party centre-right parliamentary 
2001 0 Slovenia 0 Janez Drnovsek Liberal Democrats centre-right parliamentary 
2002 0 Slovenia 0 Anton Rop Liberal Democrats centre-right parliamentary 
2003 0 Slovenia 0 Anton Rop Liberal Democrats centre-right parliamentary 
2004 0 Slovenia 1 Janez Jansa Democratic Party right parliamentary 
2005 0 Slovenia 0 Janez Jansa Democratic Party right parliamentary 
2006 0 Slovenia 0 Janez Jansa Democratic Party right parliamentary 
1989 0 Romania     semi-presidential
1990 0 Romania 1 Petre Roman FDSN centre-left semi-presidential
1991 0 Romania 0 Petre Roman FDSN centre-left semi-presidential
1992 0 Romania 1 Nicolae Vacaroiu FDSN centre-left semi-presidential
1993 0 Romania 0 Nicolae Vacaroiu Party of Social Democracy in Romania centre-left semi-presidential
1994 0 Romania 0 Nicolae Vacaroiu Party of Social Democracy in Romania centre-left semi-presidential
1995 0 Romania 0 Nicolae Vacaroiu Party of Social Democracy in Romania centre-left semi-presidential
1996 1 Romania 1 Victor Ciorbea Roman Democratic Convention centre-right semi-presidential
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1997 1 Romania 0 Victor Ciorbea Roman Democratic Convention centre-right semi-presidential
1998 1 Romania 0 Gavril Dejeu Roman Democratic Convention centre-right semi-presidential
1999 1 Romania 0 Radu Vasile Roman Democratic Convention centre-right semi-presidential
2000 0 Romania 1 Adrian Nastase Social Democratic Party centre-left semi-presidential
2001 0 Romania 0 Adrian Nastase Social Democratic Party centre-left semi-presidential
2002 0 Romania 0 Adrian Nastase Social Democratic Party centre-left semi-presidential
2003 0 Romania 0 Adrian Nastase Social Democratic Party centre-left semi-presidential
2004 0 Romania 1 Calin Popescu-Tariceanu Justice and Truth centre-right semi-presidential
2005 0 Romania 0 Calin Popescu-Tariceanu Justice and Truth centre-right semi-presidential
2006 0 Romania 0 Calin Popescu-Tariceanu Justice and Truth centre-right semi-presidential
1989 0 Russia 0     
1990 0 Russia 0     
1991 0 Russia 0 Boris Yeltsin    
1992 0 Russia 0 Boris Yeltsin    
1993 1 Russia 1 Boris Yeltsin   presidential 
1994 1 Russia 0 Boris Yeltsin   presidential 
1995 1 Russia 1 Boris Yeltsin Communist party  presidential 
1996 1 Russia 0 Boris Yeltsin Communist party  presidential 
1997 0 Russia 0 Boris Yeltsin Communist party  presidential 
1998 0 Russia 0 Boris Yeltsin Communist party  presidential 
1999 0 Russia 1 Vladimir Putin Communist party of the RF left presidential 
2000 0 Russia 0 Vladimir Putin Communist party of the RF left presidential 
2001 0 Russia 0 Vladimir Putin Communist party of the RF left presidential 
2002 0 Russia 0 Vladimir Putin Communist party of the RF left presidential 
2003 0 Russia 1 Vladimir Putin Unified Russia centre presidential 
2004 0 Russia 0 Vladimir Putin Unified Russia centre presidential 
2005 0 Russia 0 Vladimir Putin Unified Russia centre presidential 
2006 0 Russia 0 Vladimir Putin Unified Russia centre presidential 
1990 0 Ukraine 0     
1991 0 Ukraine 0     
1992 0 Ukraine 0 Leonid Kuchma    
1993 0 Ukraine 0 Leonid Kuchma    
1994 1 Ukraine 1 Vitaliy Andriiovych Masol Communikst Party of Ukraine left semi-presidential
1995 1 Ukraine 0 Yevhen K. Marchuk Communikst Party of Ukraine left semi-presidential
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1996 1 Ukraine 0 Pavlo Lazarenko Communikst Party of Ukraine left semi-presidential
1997 1 Ukraine 0
Pavlo Lazarenko/ 
Valery Pustovoitenko Communikst Party of Ukraine left semi-presidential
1998 0 Ukraine 1 Valery Pustovoitenko Communikst Party of Ukraine left semi-presidential
1999 0 Ukraine 0
Valery Pustovoitenko/ 
Viktor Yushchenko Communikst Party of Ukraine left semi-presidential
2000 0 Ukraine 0 Viktor Yushchenko Communikst Party of Ukraine left semi-presidential
2001 0 Ukraine 0 Anatoliy Kinakh Communikst Party of Ukraine left semi-presidential
2002 0 Ukraine 1 Anatoliy Kinakh Victor Yushchenko Bloc Out Ukraine centre-left semi-presidential
2003 0 Ukraine 0 Viktor Yanukovych Victor Yushchenko Bloc Out Ukraine centre-left semi-presidential
2004 0 Ukraine 0
Viktor Yanukovych/ 
Mykola Azarov Victor Yushchenko Bloc Out Ukraine centre-left semi-presidential
2005 0 Ukraine 0
Yulia Tymoshenko/ 
Yuriy Yekhanurov Victor Yushchenko Bloc Out Ukraine centre-left semi-presidential
2006 0 Ukraine 1 Victor Yanukovych Party of Regions centre-left semi-presidential
 
Source: BBC News, Country Profiles and Political Timelines, various issues. 
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